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LEGAL TECHNIQUES FOR PROTECTING FREE
DISCUSSION IN WARTIME
THE encouragement of free speech by constitutional guarantees stems from
a belief that active public discussion will provide the most favorable oppor-
tunities for individual development and the evaluation of public policy. In
a wartime democracy the preservation of free speech comes into conflict with
military needs and nationalist pressure for conformity. Prosecution of a
modern war requires specific controls to protect military information, re-
cruiting and morale. But regulations may be extended to forbid any oppo-
sition to the war or any criticism of its administration; and such a policy has
serious disadvantages. Continued vigorous criticism of the administration
of military and economic affairs is indispensable to the efficient prosecution
of the war. Preservation of the critical attitude is even more essential for
solving the problems of the peace. A plan for future world economic and
political organization can only be formulated and secure popular acceptance
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by extensive preliminary public discussion. A l',ng period of stringently
enforced national unity may leave the stamp of uninquiring conformism on
the mind of the country.' Moreover, broad restrictions have been increas-
ingly recognized as not only a limitation on individual rights, but also as a
deprivation of the public's interest in hearing and evaluating ideas.2 Although
the ultimate success of a national policy of maintaining free discussion in
wartime must depend upon public tolerance,3 the policy can only le carried
out by the development of appropriate legal techniques.
ScoPE or FREE SPErcr
Control of discussion in wartime is primarily concerned with several
recurring problems. Direct advice to resist military orders or imminent in-
duction into service is always a proscribed activity; but few such prosecutions
appeared in the last war.4 The expression of moral disapproval for all war
is certain to continue, chiefly within the ranks of the pacifist religious sects.
In the World War, both pacifists and those who expressed respect for such
beliefs were occasionally punishedY Yet pacifism is unlikely to impede the
military' effort, and preservation of respect for this small minority may well
serve as a safeguard against the permanent militarization of the nation.
Isolated outbursts of outright sympathy for the enemy are even less likely
to hinder any military activity, but public expression of such opinions may
cause breaches of the peace by vigilante groups. In a long war, governmental
repression of such direct denials of national unity is likely. The inevitable
attacks upon the justice of the war comprised the largest group of convic-
tions in the last war, although occasional dicta upheld the right to advocate
peace.6 Several prosecutions also punished any disparagement of associated
1. See MORIsON AND COMTAGER. Tnr GaoWTII or Tn A.Imruac: Rpriutac
(1937) 476.
2. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 237,
301-05 (1941) (dissenting opinion); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. F.3, 95-93 (1940) ;
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (concurring opininn); Cyrrrc,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 33, 131, 509.
3. Cf. THE FEDERALIST. No. 84 (Hamilton) on the freedrm tof the preq. "Itc
security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitutifn respecting it.
must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the pe, ple antd
of the government."
4. See notes 33 and 35 infra.
5. On pacifist opinion, see United States v. Stephens, INTxvrnrr.wzo. o N\AW
STAT TEs (U. S. Dep't of Just), Bulletin No. 116 (D. Del. 19l18 thereafter cited by
bulletin number only) ; cf. convictions of pacifist ministers cited in n..te 33 in ra. Several
leading cases punished expressions of respect for conscientious obijectors. Coldvell
v. United States, 256 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919), cert. denied, 250 U. S. ( Q (1919);
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); see Debs v. United
States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919).
6. See United States v. Debs, Bulletin No. 155 at 12 (N. D. Ohio 1918), aff'd,
249 U. S. 211 (1919); United States v. Prieth, Bulletin No. 156 at 17 (D. N. J. 1918).
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nations.7 Yet some discussion of the causes of the war, and of the policies
of other countries, is necessarily involved in clarifying the future position of
this nation in the world. The present English experience indicates that such
speech can sometimes be harmless to the military effort of a united nation. 8
Moreover, such attacks upon the war, together with vague threats of revo-
lution, usually come from local radical groups. The repression of such groups
will increase discontent, while a conciliatory policy based on improving
standards of living may draw them into the war effort. Finally, even neces-
sary criticism of the government's administrative policies may sometimes
be treated as disloyal.
In controlling various types of discussion, the attitude of those adminis-
tering the machinery is more important than any constitutional or statutory
formula. The experience of the last war suggests that a determined spirit
of repression is not hampered by forms of judicial procedure. Some judges
delivered speeches from the bench attacking the views of the accused and
demanding summary treatment of traitors.0 Juries often returned verdicts
against any manifestation of disloyalty.1 0 An army of 250,000 resourceful
private informers was enrolled to listen everywhere." Moreover, the real
7. See United States v. "The Spirit of '76", 252 Fed. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1917)
(confiscation of motion picture about American Revolution) ; cf. Mead v. United
States, 257 Fed. 639 (C. C.A. 9th, 1919). Contra: United States v. Curran, Bulletin
No. 140 at 2 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
8. In England the Communist Party's Daily Worker was allowed to propagandize
against the war for over a year during the war. The Independent Labor Party has
maintained a position in favor of a negotiated peace, and recently contested a by-election
on this issue. For a review of English defense regulations, see Carr, Crisis Legislation
in Britain (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1309.
9. The classic example is United States v. Stokes, Bulletin No. 106 (W. D.
Mo. 1918), rev'd, 264 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) (judge's charge to the jury included
long attack on defendant's Communist sympathies). See also United States v. "The
Spirit of '76", 252 Fed. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1917) ; Jeffersonian Publishing Co. v. West,
245 Fed. 585 (S. D. Ga. 1917); United States v. Windmueller, Bulletin No. 112 (D.
Alaska 1918); United States v. Taubert, Bulletin No. 108 (D. N. H. 1918). For an
extreme example of a manipulated trial see Johnson, The Conviction of Towaley
(1919) 20 NEw REPUBLIC 18.
10. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 70-73. For judicial
warnings against the readiness of juries to convict for lack of patriotism see Wolf
v. United States, 259 Fed. 388, 394 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); United States v, Sandvkck,
Bulletin No. 113 at 9 (D. Alaska 1918).' For an effective jury charge, emphasizing
the importance of fairness, see United States v. Brinton, Bulletin No. 132 (D, N. D.
1918). During the sedition prosecutions by unpopular governments in the eighteenth
century, jury control with a general verdict provided an effective safeguard for free
speech; but in a united nation the juries reflect popular prejudice against any opposition.
11. See 2 BEARD AND BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1935) 642.
This American Protective League operated with the approval and supervision of the
Department of Justice. See REP. Ai-r'y GEN. (1918) 15. For an example of their
activities in trying to "get something on" a person suspected of disloyalty, see Moc%,
CENSORSHIP 1917 (1941) 208.
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limits of free discussion were in fact determined by the federal and state
district attorneys, since these officials retained autonomy in deciding what
to prosecute. 12 The extremes to which repression of speech was thus carried
during the last war have been generally condemned.' 3 In the present war
the announced national policy 14 is to maintain an atmosphere favorable to
free discussion by confining restrictions to speed which will immediately
obstruct the military effort. All federal prosecutions must now be approved
in advance by the Department of Justice,'3 and in dismissing several prose-
cutions for casual disloyal remarks,1 6 the Department has already adopted
a liberal policy which reflects tlhe present tolerant attitude of public opinion.
The current national policy of protecting free discussion in wartime may
be implemented by the recent rigorous constitutional tests protecting freedom
of speech, and by strict construction of restrictive statutes. While military
activities may be insulated against obstruction resulting from speech, the
exercise of the war power is always said to be subject to constitutional
limitations. 7 The controversy has centered about the proper formula to
indicate what causal relation between speech and the proscribed evils will
justify, restriction of speech. The loose World War test of "tendency" has
been replaced by the "clear and present danger" rule,'8 and the substitution
has provided an opportunity for sympathetic judges to protect a wider area
of free discussion. The requirement of an immediate danger has served
to invalidate restrictions designed to prevent evils arising only after a lapse
of time.' 9 Moreover, under this test, tie defendant must be shown to have
12. Ai order of Oct., 1917, required priur authorizatioin from the DIep't of justice
before any indictments for treason were brought, and requested information on all
prosecutions under the Espionage Act. See REP. Ar's GEN. (1918) 673. After Nov.
1, 1918, prior authorization was required for all prosecutions involving criticism of
the war. See Id. at 674.
13. See address by Wendell Berge, Chief of the Criminal Division of the U. S.
Dep't of justice, Jan. 11, 1942, reprinted in QS Cong. Rec. at app. 115 (1942); interview
with Att'y Gen. Francis Biddle, N. Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1941, § vii, p. 8, cols. 3-4;
2 BEARD AND BEARD, TaE RIsE OF A.IERIQc.U CIVILIZATION (1935) 040-43: 2 Monis o
AND COmSuAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1937) 478-79. No sedition
prosecutions were brought in Massachusetts during the last war and apparently no harm
resulted to the military effort. See CHAFEE. op. cit. supra note 10, at 69.
14. Described in two addresses by Wendell Berge, Chief of the Criminal Division
of the U. S. Dep't of justice, Dec. 14, 1941, and Jan. 11, 1942, 8 Cong. Rec. at
app. 115 (1942) ; see speech by President Roosevelt, N. Y. Times, lce. 10, 1941, p. 39,
col 6.
15. See Dep't of Just. Release, Dec. 16, 1941.
16. See Dep't of Just. Release, Dec. 21, 1941.
17. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120-21 (U. S. 1866) ; see United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U. S. S1, 88 (1921) ; REP. Arrvy GEN. (1918) 20.
18. See Bridges v. California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 194 (1941); Wechsler, Sympasitin
on Civil Liberties (1941) 9 AMER. L. SCHOOL REV. 881.
19. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) ; see r. Justice Brandeis, concurring
in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927). Cf. Comment (1940) 28 CALWm
L. REv. 733, 738-40.
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participated directly in proscribed speech ;20 and, if a statute's wording is
so broad as also to forbid admittedly proper discussion, it may be held invalid
on its face.21 Finally, a presumption favorable to free speech has been de-
veloped, ' 2 so that the likelihood of trivial evils has often been held not to
justify limitations on discussion.2 3  However, the broad language of the
Gobitis case 24 may be interpreted as restoring tile presumption of statutory
validity whenever the interest of national unity is involved.
Within the framework of these minimum guarantees, wartime control of
discussion will be based on a limited number of powers. The traditional
limitation of the power of summary arrest and internment to a zone of imme-
diate military emergency may militate against its use; but if the authority
is invoked, courts are unlikely to interfere.2 a The most important federal
restrictions on free speech are derived from three sections of the still effective
1917 Espionage Act.20 Its provision against false reports or statements made
to interfere with the operation or success of the military forces was apparently
intended to prevent false rumors about troop movements. 27  But in the last
20. See Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S.
242 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357 (1927); (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 927; cf. O'Brian, Civil Liberty in IVar Time
(1919) 42 PROc. N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 275, 296.
21. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 96-98 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444 (1938) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931) ; State v. Diamond,
27 N. M. 477, 202 Pac. 988 (1921).
22. See Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court
(1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1349; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939),
(1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 531; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152, n. 4 (1938).
23. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939) (littering of streets insuflicient to
justify prohibiting distribution of handbills); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931)
(scandalous newspaper insufficient to allow censorship). And see Mr. Justice Brandeis,
concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).
24. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
25. "Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual
war." Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 127 (U. S. 1866). Yet this decision came after
the Civil War, and during the war the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in a
similar case, Ex pare Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1863). See also Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932). Yet, apart from any land fighting, large areas of
the country may possibly be declared zones of conflict and put under martial law.
Presumably an executive proclamation is necessary to accomplish this. But see United
States ex rel. Wessels v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 763-64 (E. D. N. Y. 1920), app.
dismissed, 256 U. S. 705 (1921) (cf. note 131 infra). In Canada persons may be interned
without trial on the order of any Minister. See Brewin, Civil Liberties h Canada dunrin'
Wartime (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REViEW 112, 115-21.
26. 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 33 (1940).
27. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), reeld on
other grounds, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; see United States v. Brinton, Bulletin
No. 132 at 3 (D. N. D. 1918). In a long Congressional debate, largely devoted to a
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war it was broadly construed to allow courts to pass on the truth of contro-
versial opinions about the war,28 and to punish criticism of tile administration
of the civilian auxiliaries providing food and medical aid.2 Because voluntary
recruiting was much emphasized in the last war, another section of the Act
forbade obstruction of enlistments. Since enlistment often involved a delicate
balancing of family ties against patriotism, 0 it was frequently held under
this clause that any criticism of the war effort might influence such a deci-
sion.3 ' However, under present national policy a comprehensive system of
selective service has replaced voluntary enlistment as the preferred method
for allocating men to the military forces . 2 And many judges would probably
hold that only a more direct argument would be likely to cause men to resist
the draft. Any obstruction of military recruiting can now be covered 1"
the provision in the 1940 draft act against advice to resist the draft.m If the
clause protecting enlistments is superseded by this clause protecting the draft,
the most serious existing federal threat to free discussion will be removed.
The third provision in the Espionage Act, and a similar clause in the Alien
Registration Act of 1940,34 forbid any speech causing insubordination, dis-
provision for newspaper censorship and to the imminent shortage of tin cans, the sedition
section of the Espionage Act was only mentioned four times, and was never discussed.
Yet one Congressman made a casual reference which assumed that this clause was thus
restricted. 55 CONG. REc. 3137 (1917). While this interpretation seems clearly correct,
there are no reported opinions to show its application. A fairly strict construction of
this clause was indicated in the dismissal of prosecutions at the start of the present
war. See Dep't of Just. Release, Dec. 21, 1941.
28. Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (vne of several cases involving
statements that the war was to protect the Morgan loans, with the usual refutation by
introducing the President's war message to Congress); United States v. Stephens,
Bulletin No. 116 (D. Del. 1918) (statement that war is murder).
29. United States v. Nagler, 252 Fed. 217 (W. D. Wis. 1918), rc-Vd on coal es for
of error, 254 U. S. 661 (1920) (abuse of the Red Cross); see Pierce v. United States,
252 U. S. 239, 246 (1920); Kirchner v. United States, 255 Fed. 301, 303 (C. C. A.
4th, 1918), app. dismissed, 250 U. S. 678 (1919) (broad dictum practically includes in
military forces all persons involved in supplying army). Contra: United States v.
Koenig, Bulletin No. 166 (E. D. 'Mo. 1918).
30. See United States v. Nearing, Bulletin No. 192 at 14 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
31. See United States v. Equi, Bulletin No. 172 at 11, 21 (D. Ore. 1918), contiction
aff'd, 261 Fed. 53 (C. C.A. 9th, 1919), cert. denied, 251 U. S. 560 (1920).
32. For speeches by Gen'l Hershey, National Director of Selective Service, urging
that all volunteering should be abolished, see N. Y. Times, Dc. 22, 1941, p. 10, col. 4,
and Jan. 20, 1942, p. 21, cols. 2-3.
33. 54 STAT. 894, 50 U.S. C. A. app. § 311 (Supp. 1940). There were few prose-
cutions for direct appeals to resist the World War draft. For such cases invoi 'g
religious pacifism see United States v. Graham, Bulletin No. 120 l1ieD.Tenn. 1918);
United States v. Waldron, Bulletin No. 79 (D. Vt. 1918); cf. State v. Whittaker (Cal.
Police Ct. 1917) in NELLES, ESPIONAGE Acr C.%sEs (1918) 53. And see Schencl: v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
34. 54 STAT. 670, 13 U. S. C. § 9 (1940). This section continues in effect in peace
1942]
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loyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military forces. On its face this
section would seem designed to ensure obedience by those in military service.
Yet in the World War its use to develop a- technique for protecting military
morale was overlooked in the preoccupation with suppressing minority
opinion. A few cases involved direct appeals for refusal to perform a military
duty ;31 but this section was practically converted into a general statute
against disloyalty, over the protest of only a few judges .3  Since the 1917
draft act contained no clause forbidding dissuasion,37 this provision in the
Espionage Act was usually extended to cover all who registered for the
draft ;38 and, by invoking the Spanish War statute declaring all men between
18 and 45 to be members of the "national forces," 39 the group protected was
frequently expanded to include half the male population. 40 A few dicta even
suggested that critical ideas were equally dangerous if they reached the
family or friends of anyone in the military forces.4 ' The statutory require-
ment of an intent to cause the proscribed results was assimilated' to the loose
objective tests by a presumption of constructive intent from the "natural
consequences" of actions.4 2 Moreover, some serious procedural abuses were
evident. Repetitious counts bristling with sinister adverbs were likely to
confuse the jury;43 and the introduction of any disloyal remarks made in
35. See Rutherford v. United States, 258 Fed. 855 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919). See also
the more frequent appeals to resist the draft, note 33 supra.
36. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917) (Learned
Hand, J.), the first and most thoughtful opinion in all the World War prosecutions,
rez'd, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Wolf v. United States, 259 Fed. 388 (C. C. A.
8th, 1919); United States v. Schutte, 252 Fed. 212 (D. N. D. 1918); United States v.
Hall, 248 Fed. 150 (D. Mont. 1918); United States v. Nearing, Bulletin No. 192 at
6-7 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); United States v. Henning, Bulletin No. 184 (E. D. Wis. 1918).
37. The provision [40 STAT. 81 (1917)] only forbade aiding a person to evade the
act.
38. Anderson v. United States, 264 Fed. 75, 77 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920), cert. denied,
253 U. S. 495 (1920) ; see Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 216-17 (1919).
39. 30 STAT. 361 (1898) (defining those potentially liable for military duty). Thuis
confusion was analyzed at length in United States v. Henning, Bulletin No. 184 at 7-11
(E. D. Wis. 1918).
40. United States v. Wishek, Bulletin No. 153 at 2 (D. N. D. 1918); cf. United
States v. Denson, Bulletin No. 142 at 4 (N. D. Ala. 1918) ; United States v. Goldsmith,
Bulletin No. 133 at 2-3 (N. D. Ala. 1918).
41. See United States v. Binder, Bulletin No. 126 at 4 (E. D. N. Y. 1918) ; United
States v. Weinsberg, Bulletin No. 123 at 7 (E. D. Mo. 1918). Contra: Dickson v.
United States, 278 Fed. 728 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
42. United States v. Goldsmith, Bulletin No. 133 at 7 (N. D. Ala. 1918). For a
criticism of the application -of this maxim, see United States v. Brinton, Bulletin No. 133
at 7-8 (D. N. D. 1918), where the judge pointed out that if a jury strongly disliked
any language, they would be certain to presume that its utterance would bring harm.
See also CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 118-21, 186.
43. See United States v. Hicks, Bulletin No. 160 (V. D. Okla. 1918). Cf. under
the Sedition Act of 1918 (40 STAT. 553) (see note 57 infra). United States v. Brackett,
Bulletin No. 170 (E. D. Mo. 1918) (verdict directed for the defendant on thirty-five of
forty-six counts).
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past years, as evidence of a probable present intent, could only have had
a prejudicial effect. 44 While indictments usually specified the exact language
used,4 5 a few convictions were upheld because of the general tenor uf a
speech. 40  Occasionally the circumstances were not alleged,47 and a serious
analysis of how they would bring about the proscribed evils was rarely at-
tempted. Some courts presumed that the speech would lie repeated s) as
to cause harm,48 and at least two courts accepted the broad metaphor that
danger could be forestalled when the seed was being sown.4P Under this ap-
proach, a few prosecutions were instituted against any trivial remarks that
indicated a disloyal attitude.r0 In this climate of opinion, perfunctory judicial
warnings to be fair could have but little effect. Yet in some cases judges
insisted upon some proof of likely harm,' and a few adopted a presumption
that defendant's words would not be repeated by others0 2 Where the evi-
44. See Hall v. United States, 256 Fed. 748, 750 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919); Grubl v.
United States, 264 Fed. 44 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Stokes v. United States, Bulletin
No. 106 (NV. D. Mo. 1918); rev'd, 264 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Kammann v.
United States, 259 Fed. 192, 194-95 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) (pro-Germani remarks fi,ore
the war) ; United States v. Hicks, Bulletin No. 160 at 11 (W. D. Okla. 1918) (previoaus
convict record).
45. But cf. State v. Wolf, 56 Mont. 493, 185 Pac. 556 (1919).
46. See State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 272, 166 N. NV. 181, 182 (1918). Compare
Learned Hand, J., in 'Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 543 (S.D. N.Y.
1917), ree'd on other grounds, 246 Fed. 24 (C.C. A. 2d, 1917): "The tradition of
English-speaking freedom has depended in no small part upon the merely procedural
requirement that the state point with exactness to just that conduct which violate;
the law."
47. United States v. Schutte, 2_52 Fed. 212 (D. N.D. 1918): Shilter v. United
States, 257 Fed. 724 (C.C.A. 9th, 1919); cf., under the Act of 1918 t40 STAT. 5531.
Dierkes v. United States, 274 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921 ), cert. deni'd, 257 U. S. (Aft
(1921).
48. White v. United States, 263 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 6t, 1920), cert. dcnied, 2'3 U. S.
496 (1920) (ideas would spread through the community,. and reach soddiers); cf.
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
49. See Krafft v. United States, 249 Fed. 919, 925 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) ; United State,
v. Equi, Bulletin No. 172 at 9 (D. Ore. 1918), conv'iction aff'd, 261 Fed. 53 (C. C. A.
9th, 1919), cert. denied, 251 U. S. 560 (1920). Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652,
669 (1925).
50. In Von Bank v. United States, 253 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), tie president
of a school district was convicted of causing disloyalty in the military forces by refusing
to raise the flag, with the remark that "he would just as soon see a pair of old trousers
hanging over the schoolhouse." Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 623
(1919), described in the dissenting opinion of 'Mr. Justice Holmes as "the surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man."
51. A few cases were reversed or dismissed because the indictment failed to indicate
when or to whom the words were spoken. "The circumstances are an element of the
crime!' United States v. Schutte, 252 Fed. 212, 214 (D. X. D. 1918); Fontana v.
United States, 262 Fed. 283 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
52. Kammann v. United States, 259 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) (discussion of
the background of the var with a grammar-school class); United States v. Hall,
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
dence clearly showed that the remarks were passed in private conversation
between civilians, convictions were reversed on appeal.53 And when private
committees demanded an explanation for a passive refusal to support the
war, such as a failure to buy liberty bonds or to contribute to the Red Cross,
the replies were uniformly held privileged.5 4 Nevertheless, the experience
of the last war indicates that, in an excited atmosphere, the Espionage Act
can be used to repress almost any criticism concerning the war effort.
But this can be avoided in the present war if the recent stricter constitu-
tional tests are applied in construing this statute. Prosecutions should be
instituted only in cases of actual danger, and the defendant's intent need
not be emphasized. The language actually used should be set forth in a
simply phrased indictment, and a detailed allegation of the circumstances
should specify any facts indicating a likelihood that the language would be
repeated to and would influence soldiers. Thus limited, the Espionage Act
may be used to prevent serious and immediate threats to military morale,
without imperiling freedom of civilian discussion.
The application of these standards may be tested soon in an appeal by
the Trotskyist trade union leaders convicted of sedition in Minneapolis."-
The primary issue involved a conspiracy to overthrow the government, but
scattered evidence of a program of military disaffection was pieced together
from their propaganda of several years. Passages in their literature ex-
pressed opposition to any capitalist war. In a few instances the leaders
advised their members entering the army to demand better living standards,
and once they recommended seeking new members among other soldiers.
If such activity is proscribed, agitation for military reform must be restricted
within very narrow limits. Yet the trial judge refused motions for a directed
verdict and requests for jury charges that were based on the clear and present
danger testy If this conviction is reversed for lack of evidence to go to
248 Fed. 150 (D. Mont. 1918) ; United States v. Koenig, Bulletin No. 166 (E. D. Mo.
1918) (argument with a Red Cross solicitor).
53. These cases included private conversation at home with neighbors, Erhardt
v. United States, 268 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920) ; or overheard by neighbors, State v.
Rempel, 143 Minn. 50, 172 N. W. 888 (1919) ; or to strangers on a farm, Grubl v. United
States, 264 Fed. 44 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Harshfield v. United States, 260 Fed. 659
(C. C. A. 8th, 1919); State v. Deike, 143 Minn. 23, 172 N. W. 777 (1919); or in a
boarding house, United States v. Denson, Bulletin No. 142 (N. D. Ala. 1918) (result
not reported) ; or in a train, Sandberg v. United States, 257 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. 9th,
1919). But cf. note 59 infra.
54. United States v. Pape, 253 Fed. 270 (S. D. II1. 1918); cf. State v. Ludenmann,
143 Minn. 126, 172 N. W. 887 (1919) ; Gerdes v. State, 104 Nebr. 35, 175 N. W. 606,
1023 (1919). But cf. note 29 supra.
55. United States v. Dunne, U. S. Dist. Ct. of Minn., Dec. 8, 1941.
56. The judge followed Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), which has been
undermined by Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937). See note 19 supra. But the
jury acquitted the defendants on the principal count, which charged a conspiracy to
overthrow the government with an overt act, the formation of a union defense guard
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the jury, the court's ruling on the application of the present danger standard
to military disaffection will set a strong precedent to protect civilian dis-
cussion about military affairs in the present war.
While a literal construction of the Draft and Espionage Acts is thus suffi-
cient to protect military recruiting and morale, public demands for enforced
national unity may again bring the passage of broader sedition statutesY?
Congress may have constitutional power expressly to require full civilian
support of the war. 5s But the experience of the World War suggests that,
in the atmosphere which brought their passage, broader sedition statutes
will be extended to forbid harmless remarks and constructive criticism as
well. If Congress should again forbid any manifestation of disloyalty during
the war, the constant examination of the subjective intent behind speech,
regardless of the circumstances, will make it very difficult to maintain an
atmosphere favorable to free discussion.'; Similarly statutory prohibitions
of abuse of the American form of government may ° or may not"' be inter-
preted to prevent criticism of all existing officials; but any vigorrous denun-
ciation of existing evils, such as an attack on prison brutality, G2 may be held
three years before and the purchase of four guns. The conviction on the other ctunt
involving revolution and military disaffection may thus be reversible fur lack of a clear
and present danger of revolution. See Stromberg v. California, 2W3 U. S. 359 1931).
57. In reaction against a decision strictly construing the Espionage Act [United
States v. Hall, 248 Fed. 150 (D. Mont. 1918) ], Montana and the United States Congress
passed broader sedition laws forbidding any expression of sympathy for the enemy,
encouragement of resistance to the United States, and abuse of the American form of
government or army or flag. fox-r. LAws ExmA SEsS. 1918, c. 11; 40 STAT. 553
(1918). The Department of Justice has recently indicated its view that this law
"fortunately was repealed" after the war. See address by Wendell Berge, Chief of the
Criminal Division of the Dep't of justice, Jan. 11, 1942, reprinted in & Cong. Rec.
at app. 116 (1942). For similar state statutes now in effect, see note 82 infra. If, as
is frequently suggested, such statutes are really necessary to provide protective custody
against vigilante violence, twenty-year penal sentences need not be provided. Cf. 2
HOLmEs-POLLocK LxaFRs (1941) 31.
58. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 336 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
59. The Sedition Act of 1918 (40 STAT. 553) thus punished expressions of diqlo)alty
regardless of the circumstances, including those made in private homes. Buessel v.
United States. Bulletin No. 131 (D. Conn. 1918), aff'd. 258 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 191 1 :
see Albers v. United States, 263 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) (on a train), rc,'d ,
confession of error, 256 U. S. 706 (1921); and cf. note 53 supra. Fur an example #,f
the work of private informers that was encouraged under this act, see Schoborg v.
United States, 264 Fed. 1 (C. C.A. 6th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 494 (1920)
(installation of a dictograph in a German cobbler's shop).
60. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 623-24 (1919).
61. Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. IS (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); United States v.
Ault, 263 Fed. 800, 811 (11. D. Wash. 1920). Evidently Congress intended that this
should be explicitly understood. See speech by Senator Borab, 56 Coiwo. Rrc. 4629
(1918). "
62. United States v. Steene, 263 Fed. 130 (N. D. N. Y. 1920), rcv'd on confession
of error, 255 U. S. 580 (1921).
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necessarily to reflect upon the form of government. Statutory prohibitions
against abuse of the military forces may be held to forbid criticism of the
military leaders, or of any soldier's actions.0 3 In a recent case0 4 a statute
which attempted to restrict Nazi propaganda fostering disunity, by forbidding
promotion of hostility against any racial or religious group, was held tin-
constitutional for vagueness. The court felt that it was impossible to ascertain
when a subjective emotion like hostility or abuse is caused. Moreover, older
federal and state statutes forbidding advocacy of violent revolution 5 are of
little use against the subtler fascist propaganda. These acts have been in-
voked fitfully against radical economic protest;"0 yet their application has
been constitutionally restricted to a danger of revolution in the near future.0 7
Moreover, the clauses punishing membership or affiliation with stch revo-
lutionary groups, 68 without further proof of personal advocacy, may be
unconstitutional. 69 Finally, the broadest provisions in many state acts, such
as those against encouraging any resistance to government or its officials,10
are so clearly restrictive of proper discussion that they normally would be
declared unconstitutional on their face.
In addition to the safeguards against widespread prosecution to punish
discussion, the Department of Justice hag announced an affirmative policy of
63. United States v. Vevig, Bulletin No. 162 (D. Alaska 1918) ; State v. Spartz,
140 Minn. 203, 167 N.W. 547 (1918). But cf. 56 CoNG. REc. 6040 (1918).
64. State v. Klapprott, 22 A. (2d) 877, 881-82 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1941).
65. Two federal conspiracy statutes dating from the Civil War contain prohibitions
against inciting insurrectiofi, Rr-v. STAT. § 5334 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1940), antd
against a conspiracy to overthrow the government or oppose its authority forcibly,
REv. STAT. § 5336 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 6 (1940). A broader provision against advo-
cating overthrow of the government was included in the Alien Registration Act of 1940,
54 STAT. 671, 18 U. S. C. § 10 (1940) ; see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
(1941) 440-90. Another old law, REV. STAT. § 5440 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 88 (1940),
prohibits a conspiracy to commit any federal offense, if accompanied by any overt act.
Many states have similar laws, mostly passed immediately after the World War. These
acts are collected in CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs (1941) 575-97.
66. See United States v. Dunne, U. S. Dist. Ct. of Minn., Dec. 8, 1941, cited supra
note 55; State v. Sentner, 230 Iowa 590, 298 N. W. 813 (1941), 36 ILL. L. REv. 357-
State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 4 P. (2d) 326 (1931), rehearing denied, 138 Ore. 610,
7 P. (2d) 775 (1932).
67. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937). Moreover, a conflict of authority
exists in the federal courts whether these laws cover the revolutionary parties; see
Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 111.
68. 54 STAT. 671, 18 U. S. C. § 10(a) (3) (1940); the state statutes are collected
in CHAFEE, FREE SPEEcH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 575-97.
69. See note 20 supra.
70. Although such a provision was declared invalid on its face in Stromberg v.
California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), many similar clauses are still in existence, and may
be invoked to punish criticism about the war. See for example MONT, REv. CoDE ANN.
(1935) § 10737; IOWA CODE (1939) § 12904 (hostility or opposition to government);
WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Rem. 1932) § 2564 (anything tending to encourage disrespect
for law).
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punishing interference with free discussion by invoking the old Civil Rights
Act.7 ' Now that speech has been protected against state action, the federal
government could proceed under this act against state officials who par-
ticipate in a denial of the right to speak.7 2 But the majority of attacks upon
unpopular speakers are led by private individuals, and traditionally tile
federal government has been denied power to prosecute in such instances.
In the Reconstruction era the Fourteenth Amendment was held not to provide
negroes with national rights protected against private interferencej3 Since
that time federal rights guaranteed against individual interference have af-
forded protection only to those involved in obviously federal functions, such
as participation in federal elections,7 4 or detention in the custody of a federal
marshal'5 The lack of federal power to discipline individual vigilantes was
described by a responsible official of the Department of Justice as "the one
serious gap in law enforcement" during the last war.70 Yet, as the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals indicated in 1938, 77 the weight of precedent under
the traditional construction of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it unlikely
that the courts will themselves be willing to protect free discussion against
vigilante action by creating a new federal right of free speech safeguarded
from infringement by individuals. While last year the Supreme Court ma-
jority adopted a liberal construction of the Civil Rights Act in United States
v. Classic,7 s the expanded concept of federal rights and federal functions
remained within tile traditional field of federal elections. Perhaps Congress
could punish private deprivation of free speech by declaring that full dis-
cussion of national problems is necessary to the functioning of the federal
government.7 9 Yet in any case, wartime criminal prosecutions for excesses
71. REv. STAT. §§ 5508, 5510 (1875), 18 U. S. C. §§ 51, 52 (1940).
72. Compare the prosecution of a policeman for the use of third-degree methods
incompatible with the federal guarantee of a fair trial, in United States v. Sutherland,
37 F. Supp. 344 (N. D. Ga. 1940). If state officials were held responsible for passive
failure to protect speakers, the policy might prove more effective.
73. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1803) (equal treatment in carriers and inns).
74. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884).
75. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892). An alternative test is suggested
in this case; federal protection can be provided against individual infringement of
rights created by the Constitution and dependent on its existence, but not for the natural
rights merely recognized by the Constitution.
76. O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time (1919) 42 Pnoc. N. Y. STATE BAn Ass'z
275, 293.
77. Powe v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied, 309
U. S. 679 (1940), 40 CoL- L. REv. 902, 35 ILL L. Rnv. 342. United States v. Crulk-
shank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875), refused to extend federal protection against infringements
of free speech by individuals; and a dictum offering such protection where the speech
involves federal functions has been ignored. Id. at 552.
78. 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
79. See Powe v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 147, 151 (C.C. A. 5th, 1940), cert.
denied, 309 U. S. 679 (1940). The discussion of state affairs could perhaps likewise
be protected by legislation to implement the federal guarantee of a republican govern-
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of patriotism are unlikely except in extreme cases. The active national pro.
tection of free discussion under the Civil Rights Act will thus probably be
limited to informal warnings backed by the threat of prosecution.
RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The need for encouraging or limiting discussion of national policies in
international relations and war is a single national problem that can only
be appreciated by the central government. Moreover, the outlook of state
and local authorities is apt to be dominated by narrow vision and local
partisanship. In the last war, for example, a federal policy of conciliating
minority labor groups, to capture their sympathy for the war effort and
increase their productivity, was seriously embarrassed by the repressive policy
of:.majority groups in several states.80 A policy of local cooperation with
the federal government 8 l may provide a check on the severe provisions in
some state legislation,82 and the more extreme statutes may eventually be
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Moreover. in a few recent
cases the federal courts have intervened by injunction and habeas corpus to
prevent the unconstitutional application of state laws restricting speech.",
Yet, since the state's prosecuting officials are usually autononlOus, the exist-
ence of state sedition laws puts free discussion at the mercy of county
ment, U. S. CoNsT., Art, IV, § 4. See also U. S. CONST. A-,=N. XIV, §5, for a
possible untapped source of power.
80. Under the stricter Minnesota statute in the World War (MINN. LAwS 1917,
c. 463), widespread prosecutions were instituted against members of the radical farmers'
Non-Partisan League, and especially against its President Townley and Secretary
Gilbert. John Lord O'Brian, then Assistant to the Attorney General, remarked of tli1,
law that "'the result of its adoption increased discontent." O'Brian, Civil Liberty ii
War Time (19191 42 Paoc. N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 275, 296 (contains an extendcled dls-
cussion of this problem).
81. See unpublished speech by Wendell Berge, Chief of the Criminal Division of the
U. S. Dep't of Just., Dec. 14, 1941.
82. About a dozen states have attempted to protect federal military activities by
passing statutes rsimilar "o or broader than the federal laws. The most extensive pro-
visions are in Nelbixaska, but Minnesota, Montana, and Louisiana have a widc range
of prohibitions. Three states have copied the Federal Espionage Act and four more
contain provisions against obstructing enlistment. Three specifically protect all auxiliary
civilian activities. Two more prohibit any expressiorn of disloyalty, while five vaguely
forbid any "sedition". Six others resemble the Federal Sedition Act of 1918 by punishlng
abmise of'l6rrmiof go rnment, the army or flag. These statutes are collected in CH:ArI:T,
FREE SPiiEei N THE UN ED STATES (1941) 575, 578-97.
83. 1Hagtue v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939) (injunction). Exhaustion of appeals
in the sthte courts is usually a prerequisite. See Trent v. Hunt, 39 F. Supp. 373 (S. D.
Ind. 1941) (injunction refused by three-judge court) ; i re Morgenstern, U. S. Dist,
Ct. of Tex., Sept. 19, 1941 (habeas corpus granted) ; cf. E.r parte Starr, 263 Fed, 145
(D. Mont. "1920)
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attorneys and police court judges.34 Enforcement of the declared national
policy of preserving free discussion in wartime thus runs squarely into tile
dual sovereignty inherent in a federal system.
In the allocation of governmental powers between nation and states, the
federal powers are traditionally distinguished from the areas of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction.s5 Some federal powers are called exclusively
national,8 6 but others may be delegated to the states.87 In a field of con-
current jurisdiction, an exercise of the federal power usually supersedes and
suspends similar state laws ;s yet occasionally the state may continue to
retain concurrent jurisdiction. 0 When Congress has occupied and suspended
state legislation in part of a field of concurrent power, the jurisdiction of
the remainder of the field has been determined by two tests: the objective
need of uniformity according to the type of activity regulated,"" and the
84. It is not at all surprising that such administration during the World Var tof
the state statutes cited supra note 82 brought stringent restrictions on free discus'cn.
Several convictions involved private conversations, State v. Rempel, 143 Minn. 50,
172 N. W. 888 (1919) (rev'g conviction); or refusals to make financial cuntributiuns,
under vigilante pressure, State v. Ludemann, 143 Minn. 126, 172 N. NV. 8W7 (1919
(rev'g conviction); Gerdes v. State, 104 Nebr. 35, 175 N.NW. 606, 1023 (1919) (rcVq
conviction); and cf. State v. Gibson, 189 Iowa 1212, 174 N. NV. 34 (1919). See also
Ex parte Starr, 263 Fed. 145 (1920) (involving Montana conviction for refusal to hiss
the flag, under mob orders); State v. Freerks, 140 Minn. 349, 16S N. AV. 23 (1918)
(counts for remarks that socks knitted would never reach the soldiers, and that the Star
Spangled Banner was "rotten doggerel"). Yet, except in ifnnesota and Montana,
repression by state governments operated largely through the threat of prosecution:
reported appeals are remark-ably few, and in over half of these the convictions were
reversed.
85. See Ex parte 'McNeil, 13 Wall. 236, 240 (U. S. 1871) (interstate commerce).
See generally Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power (1934) 34 CoL L
REv. 995.
86. See U. S. Coxsr., Art. I, §§ 8, 10; and cf. Wabash, St. L. and Pac. Ry. v.
Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886) (interstate commerce); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 2&3
(U. S. 1849) (foreign commerce); Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. Supp. 470 (M. D. Pa.
1939), aff'd on other grounds, 312 U. S. 52 (1941) (alien registration). The obviously
exclusive federal functions, such as the war power, have rarely been the subject of
litigation; but most powers are either concurrent or may be delegated to the states.
See Grant, supra note 85, at 1008-09.
87. See Clark Dist. Co. Y. Western Md. R.R., 242 U. S. 311 (1917) (interstate
commerce) ; In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488 (1905) (Indian affairs).
88. U. S. Coxsr., Art. VI, § 2; Oregon-Wash. R.R. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87
(1926) (agricultural quarantine); see Grant, supra note 85, at 1009 et scq. For examples
of state regulations, before any federal action, in a field of concurrent jurisdiction,
see Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 (1914) (interstate commerce);
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907) (protection of the flag).
89. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) (sedition) ; cf. Sexton v. California,
189 U. S. 319 (1903) (extortion).
90. See Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236, 240 (U. S. 1871) (interstate commerce);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319 (U. S. 1851) (interstate commerce).
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subjective intent of Congress, either to leave the rest of the field free0' or
to allow the states to continue additional regulations.0 2
The state's activities in connection with the exclusively national power
to wage war have involved the exercise of various types of powers. It is
hardly profitable to debate whether the states as separate sovereignties are
also at war with the foreign enemy. In many activities the state organization
acts in a federal capacity under federal direction. Where a definite local
interest arises, as in the protection of property from sabotage, 3 the states
retain the power of separate action. If a real danger of a breach of the peace
arises from speech, a state can take the speaker into protective custody.
Moreover, the states may often act spontaneously under a loosely-defined
power to aid the federal government's war effort. Thus a state's power
to encourage national patriotism by protecting the flag from misuse, when
there was no federal legislation in the field, was upheld in Halter v.
Nebraska.94 After its citizens have entered the national army, a state may
likewise provide additional pay for them.1 Yet in two situations definite
limits have been set upon the state's power to decide how to help federal
policy. No state legislation in a concurrent field can stand if it comes into
direct conflict wijh federal policy under an extension of the war power; the
entrance of superior federal power into the field suspends all state jurisdic-
tion.00 Second, in the punishment of offenses against the national military
effort, state jurisdiction has traditionally been sharply restricted. Treason
in a national war has thus been recognized as exclusively a matter of federal
jurisdiction, and not an offense against a state.0 7 In an early case a divided
Supreme Court apparently indicated that, after the federal government has
partly occupied the field by providing penalties, the states cannot continue
to punish disobedience to a national call for the militia. 8 Under these
91. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 (U. S. 1942) (pure food);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912) (interstate commerce).
92. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940) (interstate commerce); Savage v.
Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912) (pure food and drugs).
93. The federal government has recently promoted the passage by the states of it
new model act against sabotage. See Warner, The Model Sabotage Prevention Act
(1941) 54 HAv. L. Rav. 602; Pressman, Leider, and Cammer, Sabotage and Nationjal
Defense (1941) 54 HAav. L. REv. 632.
94. 205 U. S. 34 (1907).
95. Gustafson v. Rhinow, 144 Minn. 415, 175 N.W. 903 (1920). Cf. VT. LAWs
1941, c. 179.
96. Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 150 (1919). See nlso
Dakota Cen. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163 (1919).
97. "We think the jurisdiction of the state courts does not extend to the offense
of treason against the United States," People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 549, 553 (N. Y.
1814) ; Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569 (1866).
98. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1820). Most of the important arguments
involved in later discussions under the war power appeared in this case.
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analogies, if national policy seeks to protect a certain type of criticism about
the war, such remarks could not be made an offense against a state.
In the World War, several states sought to protect national unity by
passing sedition statutes similar to or broader than the Federal Espionage
Act. State court decisions followed conflicting interpretations of the relation
between state and federal jurisdiction over opposition to the war. In cases
overruling municipal prohibitions, a doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction
was announced. 99 Yet in decisions on state legislation, the courts assumed
originally concurrent jurisdiction and suggested several theories -federal
occupation of the field superseding all state legislation, 10 0 continuing con-
current state jurisdiction,' and continuing state jurisdiction to pass broader
regulations in the remainder of the field.10 2 In Gilbert z,. Miznesota'0 3 the
question split the Supreme Court into four groups. In McKenna's majority
opinion, the notion of any possible separation of sovereignties in a unified
national effort was swept away as "cold and technical reasoning .
[that brings] an instinctive and immediate revolt."'14 The doctrine of the
state's power to help patriotic effort was taken from Hailer v. Nebraska,
where there was no federal statute, and extended to give the state an almost
plenary discretion in attempting to help. Under this theory the state not
only retained concurrent jurisdiction in a field occupied by federal statutes,
but could also pass broader regulations. The existence of federal legislation
in the field was thus in fact irrelevant, and the difference between the state
and federal laws was not even noted in the opinion. As in the state decisions,
under the theory that no national right of free speed protected against state
action was then established, the conflict with national policy was not so
apparent. 0 5 Holmes concurred in the result with the majority, and White
dissented on the ground that exercise of the superior federal power
99. Ex paric Taft v. Shaw, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S. W. 457 (1920) (agrancy ordinance
used to -forbid criticism of the war); New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, S9 N. J.
Eq. 387, 105 Atl. 72 (Ch. 1918) (prohibition of German-language newspapers); Star
Co. . Brush, 103 Misc. 631, 170 N. Y. Supp. 987 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Star Co. v. Brush,
172 N. Y. Supp. 661 (Sup. Ct. 1918), rev'd, 185 App. Div. 261, 172 N. Y. Supp. 851
(2d Dep't 1918); Star Co. v. Brush, 104 Misc. 404, 172 N. Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct.
1918) (various attempts to exclude specific newspapers).
100. Ex parte Meckel, 87 Tex. Cr. 120, 124, 220 S. W. 81, 83 (1919) (reversal ,,n
rehearing).
101. State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. NV. 181 (1918); State v. Kahn, 56 Mont.
108, 182 Pac. 107 (1919).
102. State v- Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. NV. 181 (1918); State v. Tachin, 92 N. J.
L. 269, 106 Atl. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 93 N. J. L. 485, 103 atl. 318 (1919), app.
dismissed, 254 U. S. 662 (1920).
103. 254 U. S. 325 (1920).
104. Id. at 329.
105. The Gilbert case in 1920 was the last definite refusal by the Supreme Court
majority to declare that free speech vras protected against state action. Despite a broad.
dictum contra in 1922 [see Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 538, 543
(1922)] this guarantee was announced in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
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necessarily occupied the whole field and suspended all state action. In a dis-
sent by Brandeis, the whole responsibility under the war power, including
determination of the extent of free speech as a necessary part of popular
participation in the war, was held to be an exclusive federal function. 100
Likewise, on his alternative theory that free speech is a national right pro-
tected against the states, even under concurrent jurisdiction the broader state
sedition acts are void for conflict with supreme federal policy.
The recent increasing protection of free speech against state laws t 7 has
brought constitutional interpretation into direct opposition to McKenna's
theory that the states possess unlimited autonomy and discretion in cooper-
ating with national policy. Under the present immediate-and-serious danger
test, many of the broader state sedition statutes are probably unconstitutional
on their face. Moreover, in annulling a state Alien Registration Act, the
broad language of Hines v. Davidowitz 0 8 has indicated a more radical line
of attack upon all state sedition legislation. Under this theory, where the
powers exercised are incidental to a supreme national power, as in inter-
national affairs, and the regulations involve restrictions on civil liberties, a
strong presumption arises against concurrent or broader state jurisdiction.
In such a situation, any Congressional legislation occupying part of the field
will be presumed to intend suspension of similar or broader state legislation
and the establishment of a uniform national policy. As the dissenting opinion
pointed out, so strong an inference of national suspension of state laws is
almost unique in the allocation of concurrent state and federal jurisdictio. 100
Under the analogy of the Hines case, the partial limitations imposed by
Congress upon discussion of the war may supersede all state jurisdiction
for similar or broader restrictions. If in a state sedition case the Supreme
Court should declare that control of discussion about the war is part of the
national war power; no state legislation punishing criticism of the war may
exist, at least without express Congressional authorization.110 The respon-
106. 254 U. S. 325, 336-39. Yet later in the opinion lie indicated that Congress
could delegate this federal power to the states, by expressly authorizing state lawn.
Id. at 341-42.
107. See note 105 supra.
108. 312 U. S. 52 (1941). In Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. Supp. 470 (M. D, Pa.
1939), a three-judge federal court invalidated the state act as encroaching on an exclusive
federal field. But during the appeal, Congress occupied the field by passing a less
restrictive act, and the Supreme Court reserved the question of an exclusive federal
power.
109. Among the cases cited in favor of the contrary presumption upholding state
jurisdiction is Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) ; see Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52, 80 (1941).
110. If jurisdiction over sedition were held to be an exclusive federal power, as
with treason (see note 97 .rpra], the possibility of hasty and ill-considered Congressional
authorization to the states in a time of crisis would be removed. Yet the Supreme
Court has recently shown a preference for interpretation in terms of Congressional
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sibility and the power to implement the full national policy will then be
placed squarely upon the national Govermnent.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS OF COMIUNICATION
Since the recent development of the great institutional means of communi-
cation- the press, radio, motion pictures and mails - intelligent public par-
ticipation in the war effort has become dependent upon a constant flow of
information about military and economic developments. Mthough individual
speech is necessarily restricted only by the threat of subsequent punishment, a
prior censorship may be imposed to prevent the publication of military infor-
mation unknown and valuable to the eneny. While such control will be exerted
largely through secrecy at the source and censorship of foreign cables,'
the new Office of Censorship has instituted a voluntary press censorship
and has indicated the types of military information to be withheld at all
times."' Regulation of radio and motion pictures can be implemented through
use of the elaborate codes of industrial self-government;ll 3 and in radio
the federal government retains extreme sanctions by powers of licensing"-
and of taking over any station.1la The survival of local censorship of motion
pictures may involve a conflict of state and federal jurisdiction,""0 but any
problems that arise will probably be settled by cooperation with the Office
of Censorship.
intent rather than lack of power. See Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence
of the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1357-67. In either case, some states
would probably attempt to retain jurisdiction by expanding the concepts of breach of
the peace and disorderly conduct. Such restrictions can only be controlled by federal
judicial review in each case. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
111. Authorized by Pub. L. No. 354, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 18, 1941) §303,
and delegated to the Office of Censorship on the following day, 6 EED. REc. 6625 (1941).
112. This censorship code proscribes the publication of information about troops and
ships, casualty lists, munitions output and weather conditions. See N. Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1942, p. 12, coL 1.
113. Thus the CODE OF THE NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROAC,,AsTmEs (1939) vas supple-
mented on the outbreak of var by special regulations which forbade broadcasting vital
military information and any unconfirmed rumors. See N. Y. Times, De". 22, 1941,
p. 14, col. 6. For the code governing the motion picture industry, see E.;sr & Lumezv,
THE CENsoR MAR HES ON (1940) 317-28; Comment (1939) 49 YAEa L. J. 87, 102
ct seq.
114. 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 301 (1940).
115. The power derived from 48 STAT. 1104 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 606(c) (1940),
was delegated on Dec. 12, 1941, to the Defense Communications Board. See 6 FEP.
REG. 6367 (1941). For the further authority granted on the outbreak of war, see
Pub. L. No. 413, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 26, 1942); Comment (1942) 51 YLE
L. J. 629, 646-48. Yet it is unlikely that these powers will be widely used. See X. Y.
Times, Dec. 24, 1941, p. 10, col.S.
116. For the confusion of conflicting authority over motion pictures in the last war,
see Mocc, CENSORSHIP 1917 (1941) 172-89. State prohibition of war movies approved
by the federal government would involve the jurisdictioinal issues discussed on pp. 310-15
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A possibility of severe restriction of discussion in the press is latent in
the traditional "practically plenary" power to exclude matter from the
mails.'" The original view that a refusal of the mail facilities could not
interfere with freedom of the press, because other means of circulation could
be found,"18 would not be seriously argued now."1 9 The courts have shown
a tolerant attitude towards statutory prohibitions of the use of the mails
by fraudulent and lottery schemes.'2 0  To rationalize such exclusions, the
broad dictum has developed that use of the mails, and especially of the sub-
sidized second class, 21 is a privilege that Congress may grant or withdraw
at will for any reason. 2 2  Similarly, under these statutes the courts have
allowed the sanction to be applied in informal proceedings by administrative
officials, whose findings are in fact final. 2 3 A provision in the 1917 Espionage
supra. But Eureka Prod. Inc. v. Lehman, 17 F. Supp. 259 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), aft'd,
302 U. S. 634 (1937), indicates that a decision upholding federal supremacy in this
situation would require over-ruling Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio,
236 U. S. 230 (1915), which approved state censorship of movies and rejected contentions
based upon free speech and the burden on interstate commerce. See generally Comment
(1939) 49 YALE L. J. 87.
117. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U. S. 407, 411 (1921).
.118. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) ; see Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,
246 Fed. 24, 27 (C. C.A. 2d, 1917).
119. The significance of free circulation through the mails for the guarantee of a
free press is indicated by the fact that over one billion pounds of mail were carried
under the second class privilege in the last fiscal year. See REP.. POSTMASTER GEgt.
(1941) 32. The great metropolitan newspapers are now widely circulated by mail;
and the smaller periodicals, which are more apt to be affected by a wartime control
of the mails, are often wholly dependent on the postal facilities for access to their
scattered audience. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 249 (1936).
120. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) (lottery) ; In re Rapier, 143 U, S, 110
(1892) (lottery) ; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904) (fraud).
121. See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913). Yet the second
class rate is in practice essential for free circulation. Cf. note 119 supra. Without
judicial review of the rulings of the Postmaster General, "that official had the power
to practically destroy any magazine or newspaper by merely withdrawing the second
class privilege from such magazine or periodical." Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman,
152 Fed. 787, 793 (E. D. Mo. 1907).
122. "There can be no doubt that the United States may prohibit the carriage by
mail of such things as it pleases." American Civ. Lib. Union v. Kiely, 40 F. (2d) 451,
452 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). See Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. (2d) 227, 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1930),
aff'd, 49 F. (2d) 1077 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931), cert. denicd, 284 U. S. 648 (1931). For
the background cf. cases cited smpra note 120. See Deutsch, Freedom of the Press amld
of the Mails (1938) 36 Mclir. L. REv. 703; Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. RE.v 474.
123. Although partly justified by practical necessity, the rather summary adminis-
trative procedure usually adopted by the Post Office Dep't has been widely criticized.
On fraud orders, see Monograph of Attorney General's Committee on Administrathc
Procedure, pt. 13, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 34--87; Note (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 1479. On revocation of second class permits, see Id. at 4-33. Yet the
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Act excluding from the mails all matter that violated the Act 24 thus gave
the Post Office final power to restrict severely the circulation of any paper.12
Although a statement in the Congressional debates indicated an intent to
limit the exclusion to the single issue found to violate the Act,12 6 the Depart-
ment excluded one issue of Victor Berger's Socialist newspaper, and then
invoked the requirement of regular mailing in another statute defining the
second class privilege127 in order to exclude all future issues from the
cheaper rate. Over vigorous dissents by Holmes and Brandeis, the Supreme
Court majority upheld the Department by a presumption that similar viola-
tions would continue.128 During the recent development of a presumption
favoring free discussion in various forms, the theory of a plenary postal
power has not been disturbed. The exclusion of one issue from the mails
need not raise the separate question of the continuance of a second class
permit. Moreover, the exclusion of newspapers from an important means
of circulation should now be recognized as an interference with freedom of
courts have generally refused to reverse such determinations, unless they are "clearly
wrong." See Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138 (1922).
124. 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. §343 (1940). Note the curious expectation
of full judicial review expressed by Chairman Vebb of the House Judiciary Committee,
who was in charge of the bill, in 55 CoNrG. Rzc. 1836 (1917).
125. Since their lawyers were selected for other routine work and not for their
views on civil liberties, the Post Office Dep't issued some remarkable convictions for
violation of the Espionage Act. A history book by James Harvey Robinson was
proscribed for not being sufficiently anti-German; VB.LEN, Iwn_ A., GERMANY AND
THE IN1DUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1915) was recommended for general reading by George
Creel, and then excluded from the mails. See MocT, CENsORsHIP 1917 (1941) 145-71.
One issue of THE NATON was excluded for criticizing Samuel Gompers, but President
Wilson intervened to reverse this decision. See VILLA. , FICHTING YEArs (1939) 327,
354. Apparently there was no cooperation with the Dep't of Justice to enforce a uniform
national policy. See O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time (1919) 42 Psoc. N. Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N 310-11. The Post Office Dep't has not indicated its policy in the present
war.
126. The same title of the Espionage Act excluded from the mails all written or
printed matter that violated the Act or was treasonable or anarchistic; and these pro-
visions were vigorously debated on several days. The modification made in the House
judiciary Committee was thus described by Representative Volstead: ". . . The only
power we left in the bill over the mails gives the postmasters the right to exclude
treasonable or anarchistic matter - exclude that particular edition, the particular article."
55 CONG. REc. 1607 (1917). No material change in this respect was indicated in the
conference report, 55 CONG. REc. 3130, 3307 (1917).
127. 20 STAT. 359 (1879), 39 U. S. C. §226 (1940).
128. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U. S. 407 (1921). For criticism of the "privilege" doctrine in this case, see also
FR-NKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLm-ES AND THE CO NSTITUTION (1938) 57; M3onoraph
of Attorney General's Committee ons Admnhistratve Procedure, supra note 123, at 2-4,
15, 29. For other wartime cases see Burleson Y. United States e.r rel. Workigmen's
Cooperative Publishing Co., 274 Fed. 749 (App. D. C. 1921); Jeffersonian Publishing
Co. v. West, 245 Fed. 585 (S. D. Ga. 1917).
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the press that requires constitutional protection 120 tinder serious judicial
review.
CONTROL OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES
In wartime special regulations are necessary over the activities of persons
suspected of sympathy and communication with foreign governments. A
little-used old statute forbids any unauthorized correspondence with a foreign
government, to influence its policy toward the United States.18 0 And more
important, the collection and transmission of military information to the
enemy will be summarily punished. 131 Although the constitutional definition
of treason includes "adhering to" an enemy, 32 the experience of the last
war indicates that the traditional strict construction of this clause will not
permit its use to punish speech criticizing the war.188
The propaganda of foreign countries, seeking to undermine American
solidarity or to secure American support for their own post-war aims, requires
very different treatment. By forcing disclosure of the sources of such ideas,
Congress has sought to implement their evaluation under the normal demo-
cratic process of free discussion. The original MacCormack Act of 19381814
required public registration of all agents of foreign governments or groups,
but the law was not vigorously enforced. A series of amendments passed
after the outbreak of war 35 have recently been vetoed, with a reconmenda-
129. "The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the
power of the licensor." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938).
130. REv. STAT. § 5335 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 5 (1940). A plea for expanded use of
this statute may be found in Brabner-Smith, Subversive Propaganda, The Past and the
Present (1941) 29 GEo. L. J. 809, 812, n. 10. See also 40 STAT. 226 (1917), 22 U. S. C.
§231 (1940).
131. Spies may be punished in civil courts under the Espionage Act, 40 STAT, 217
(1917), 50 U. S. C. §§ 31-32 (1940) ; or in wartime by court-martial, under 41 STAyr.
804 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1554 (1940).
132. U. S. CoxsT., Art. III, §3; enacted into statute in R v. STAT. §§5331-33
(1875), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1-3 (1940).
133. Treason usually involves insurrection, espionage or supplying munitions to aid
the enemy. See Warren, What is Giving ,,lid and Comfort to the Eiinky? (1918)
27 YAtm L. J. 331, for a classification of possible offenses. Several eases have definitely
indicated that verbal opposition to the war alone could not be treason. See Charge
to the Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18, 271 (S. D. N. Y. 1861). Several unsuccessful
prosecutions were brought during the last war to test this weapon against speech,
In United States v. Werner, 247 Fed. 708 (E. D. Pa. 1918), the court-overruled a
demurrer to permit evidence on whether the words spoken were part of a treasonable
act; but the prosecution was later dismissed for lack of such proof, Cf. Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920). Since there have been no convictions for treason
in over one hundred years, prosecutions for discussion about the present war will
probably not attempt to use this weapon. See generally REP. ATr'y Gi, . (1918) 41-42.
134. 52 STAT. 631 (1938), 22 U. S. C. §§611-16 (1940).
135. See 87 Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1941, at 10323-26.
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